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 RECONSTITUTING THE FUTURE: AN EQUALITY 
AMENDMENT 
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON & KIMBERLÉ W. CRENSHAW† 
“unto the Seventh Generation . . . ” 
Iroquois Law of Peace1 
A new constitutional amendment offers a new beginning. The equality 
paradigm proposed here recognizes the failures of what is, turns away from 
language and interpretive canons rooted in an unjust past, and imagines a 
fully functioning democracy as the inheritance of future generations. This 
proposal reenvisions constitutional equality from the ground up: it centers 
on rectifying the founding acts and omissions of race and sex, separately and 
together, and incorporates similar but distinct inequalities.2 It is informed by 
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 1.  This phrase is considered common to multiple traditions. Though it does not appear exactly in 
the Iroquois Great Law of Peace, the notion of fealty to future generations is written there in symbols on 
wampum. See Terri Hansen, How the Iroquois Great Law of Peace Shaped U.S. Democracy, PBS (Dec. 
17, 2018, 10:48 AM), https://www.pbs.org/native-america/blogs 
/native-voices/how-the-iroquois-great-law-of-peace-shaped-us-democracy [https://perma 
.cc/7JX6-QLTJ]; see also Gerald Murphy, Modern History Sourcebook: The Constitution of the Iroquois 
Confederacy, FORDHAM U. (Apr. 12, 2019), https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/mod 
/iroquois.asp [https://perma.cc/BQ8E-79JR]. The most widely cited iteration of the Seventh Generation 
concept was expressed by the former head of the Six Nations of the Iroquois Confederacy, Leon Shenan-
doah (d. 1996): “Look behind you. See your sons and your daughters. They are your future. Look farther 
and see your sons’ and your daughters’ children and their children’s children even unto the Seventh Gen-
eration. That’s the way we were taught. Think about it: you yourself are a Seventh Generation.” Gina 
Boltz, Words from the Circle: Native American Quotes, NATIVE VILLAGE (2016), https://www.nativevil-
lage.org/Libraries/Quote/Native%20American%20Quotes%2034.htm [https://perma.cc/3RC2-XH9Z]. 
Fealty to subsequent generations is deeply rooted in Iroquois civilization, as evidenced by its inclusion in 
the constitution of the Iroquois Confederacy. See CONST. IROQUOIS NATIONS art. 28 (“Look and listen 
for the welfare of the whole people and have always in view not only the present but also the coming 
generations, even those whose faces are yet beneath the surface of the ground—the unborn of the future 
Nation.”); id. art. 57. 
 2.  This proposal reflects insights, aspirations, and critiques of many thinkers and actors—activists, 
lawyers, theorists, humans with a stake in taming illegitimate power. The Equality Amendment presented 
here is the joint product of two intensive meetings coconvened by the ERA Coalition and the African 
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prior efforts to integrate equality into the constitutional landscape that have 
been decimated by political reversals and doctrinal backlash. It aggregates 
the insights, aspirations, and critiques of many thinkers and actors who have 
seized this moment to breathe new life into the nation’s reckoning with ine-
quality. It neither looks back to celebrate amendments whose transformative 
possibilities have been defeated nor participates in contemporary hand-
wringing over equality’s jurisprudential limitations. It seeks to make equality 
real and to matter now. We argue that a new equality paradigm is necessary 
and present one form it could take. 
I. WHY REAL EQUALITY MATTERS NOW 
Equality is the foundational problem of the American Republic. White 
supremacy and male dominance, separately and together, were hardwired 
into a proslavery and tacitly gender-exclusive Constitution from the begin-
ning. All enslaved people, Native people, and women were consciously and 
 
American Policy Forum at Columbia Law School, cochaired by the authors on November 19, 2016 and 
December 20, 2016, in which Charles Lawrence, Mari Matsuda, Gloria Steinem, Carol Jenkins, Jessica 
Neuwirth, Terry O’Neill, and Carol Robles Roman participated. Their acumen, insights, and erudition 
contributed greatly to the final draft, which we have since modified slightly. While the discussions were 
collective, the authors are solely responsible for any errors in the content of the proposal and the argu-
ments herein. 
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purposely excluded.3 White men of property4 intentionally designed the con-
stituting document to ensure the continued institutional existence of the en-
slavement of Africans and people of African descent,5 the exclusion of 
 
 3.  As Kathleen Sullivan observed, 
[T]he U.S. Constitution, in its original text, never referred to women at all. The only known 
use of the pronoun ‘she’ in the framing deliberations concerned a later-rejected clause that 
would have referred to the rendition of fugitive slaves. . . . The Constitution provided no ex-
plicit protection . . . against laws that disenfranchised women, excluded them from juries, 
barred married women from owning property or suing in their own capacity, and the like. 
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutionalizing Women’s Equality, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 735, 735–36 (2002). The 
tension between women seeking constitutional representation and men resisting it can be seen in letters 
between Abigail and John Adams in 1776. Abigail Adams pled: 
I long to hear that you have declared an independency—and by the way in the new Code of 
Laws which I suppose it will be necessary for you to make I desire you would Remember the 
Ladies, and be more generous and favourable to them than your ancestors. Do not put such 
unlimited power into the hands of the Husbands. Remember all Men would be tyrants if they 
could. If particular care and attention is not paid to the Ladies we are determined to foment a 
Rebelion, and will not hold ourselves bound by any Laws in which we have no voice, or 
Representation. 
Letter from Abigail Adams to John Adams (Mar. 31, 1776), in 1 ADAMS FAMILY CORRESPONDENCE 
(1761-1776) 369, 370 (L. H. Butterfield et al. eds., 1961) (original spelling retained). John Adams’s reply, 
combined jocularity and denial with a threatening bottom-line common to the language of misogyny then 
and now: 
Depend upon it, We know better than to repeal our Masculine systems. Altho they are in full 
Force, you know they are little more than Theory. We dare not exert our Power in its full 
Latitude. We are obliged to go fair, and softly, and in Practice you know We are the subjects. 
We have only the Name of Masters, and rather than give up this, which would compleatly 
subject Us to the Despotism of the Peticoat, I hope General Washington, and all our brave 
Heroes would fight. 
Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams (Apr. 14, 1776), in 1 ADAMS FAMILY CORRESPONDENCE 
(1761-1776), supra, at 381, 382 (original spelling retained). 
 4. Among the property-owning white men generally recognized as “Founding Fathers,” the fol-
lowing owned slaves: Charles Carroll; Samuel Chase; Benjamin Franklin, who eventually manumitted 
his slaves and became an abolitionist; Button Gwinnett; John Hancock; Patrick Henry; John Jay; Thomas 
Jefferson; Richard Henry Lee; James Madison; Charles Cotesworth Pinckney; Benjamin Rush; Edward 
Rutledge; and George Washington. See Anthony Iaccarino, The Founding Fathers and Slavery, 
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica 
.com/topic/The-Founding-Fathers-and-Slavery-1269536 [https://perma.cc/4Q9C-HDA9]. 
 5. “[O]f the 11 clauses in the Constitution that deal with or have policy implications for slavery, 
10 protect slave property and the powers of masters. Only one, the international slave-trade clause, points 
to a possible future power by which, after 20 years, slavery might be curtailed . . . .” David Waldstreicher, 
How the Constitution Was Indeed Pro-Slavery,  
ATLANTIC (Sept. 19, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/09/how-the 
-constitution-was-indeed-pro-slavery/406288 [https://perma.cc/SNX5-NHK9]; see also DON E. 
FEHRENBACHER, THE SLAVEHOLDING REPUBLIC 15–47 (Ward M. McAfee ed., 2001) (describing the 
role of ‘slavery in the founding of the United States and how the Constitution protects slavery); DAVID 
WALDSTREICHER, SLAVERY’S CONSTITUTION 107–52 (2009) (describing how the Constitution protects 
slavery); Juan F. Perea, Race and Constitutional Law Casebooks: Recognizing the Proslavery Constitu-
tion, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1123, 1123–25 (2012) (same). 
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women from full citizenship, and the silencing of all of their voices in au-
thoritative forums.6 Enslaved Africans were counted as three-fifths of a per-
son to give political weight to slave-owning states;7 the Electoral College 
was configured to assure the power of slave states in electing the federal 
executive officer;8 no woman or enslaved person was permitted to vote. 
Equality was not mentioned in either the debates in Philadelphia or the re-
sulting document. This raced and gendered institutionalization of power was, 
and has been, presented as the epitome of freedom and independence. 
Since the Founding, constitutional amendments and legislation—im-
pelled by armed struggle and urgent organizing—have guaranteed equality 
based on race and sex to some degree. This progress has emerged from cat-
aclysmic upheavals and decades-long agitation to address the raw expression 
of subordination built into the Constitution. Limited equality rights have, at 
times, been extended to women and people of color by judicial interpretation 
and legislation.9 Yet, retraction and resistance to these efforts hollowed out 
 
 6.  It is said that the Iroquois Confederacy’s structures influenced Franklin and the Framers, but the 
Iroquois’s recognition of women’s equality and their requirement that every decision be considered for 
its impact on the Seventh Generation were omitted. See H.R. Con. Res. 331, 100th Cong. (1988) (enacted) 
(acknowledging the contribution of the Iroquois Confederacy to the U.S. Constitution, noting Franklin’s 
admiration for the Iroquois Confederacy and its influence on the American political system). This position 
is considered inaccurate by scholars who research written records. See Erik M. Jensen, The Harvard Law 
Review and the Iroquois Influence Thesis, 6 BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 225, 225 (2017) (dismissing “the 
Iroquois influence thesis” as “nonsense”); Elisabeth Tooker, The United States Constitution and the Iro-
quois League, 35 ETHNOHISTORY 305, 305 (1988) (“A number of writers have suggested that the League 
of the Iroquois provided the model for the United States Constitution and the ideas embodied in it. A 
review of the evidence in the historical and ethnographic documents, however, offers virtually no support 
for this contention.”); Jack Rakove, Did the Founding Fathers Really Get Many of Their Ideas of Liberty 
from the Iroquois?, HIST. NEWS NETWORK (July 21, 2005), https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/12974 
[https://perma.cc/H3AH-Q5VE]. 
 7.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. 
 8.  At the Constitutional Convention, James Madison suggested that a direct presidential election 
“would have been a dealbreaker [sic] for the South” because slaves could not vote and the “slaveholding 
South would basically lose every time.” Akhil Reed Amar, Opinion, Actually, the Electoral College Was 
a Pro-Slavery Ploy, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes 
.com/2019/04/06/opinion/electoral-college-slavery.html [https://perma.cc/V5ZL-N59D]. Despite alter-
native interpretations, there is no disputing that the South “had extra seats in the Electoral College because 
of its slaves.” Id. And while the implications of the system were abundantly clear by the time the Consti-
tution was amended to modify the Electoral College, “Jefferson’s Southern allies steamrollered over 
Northern congressmen who explicitly proposed eliminating the system’s pro-slavery bias.” Id.; see also 
Alan Singer, Slavery and the Electoral College: One Last Response to Sean Wilentz, HIST. NEWS 
NETWORK (Apr. 21, 2019), https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/171783 [https://perma.cc/HS75-
QHR3] (agreeing that the Electoral College defended the institution of slavery). 
 9. Following the Civil War, constitutional amendments aimed to promote racial equality, see U.S. 
CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV, while Congress enacted laws intended to deinstitutionalize Jim Crow, 
see Civil Rights Act of 1875, Pub. L. No. 43-114, 18 Stat. 335; Third Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 42-
22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871); Second Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 41-99, 16 Stat. 433 (1871); First Enforce-
ment Act, Pub. L. No. 41-114, 16 Stat. 140 (1870); Freedmen’s Bureau Act of 1866, Pub. L. No. 39-200, 
14 Stat. 173; Civil Rights Act of 1866, Pub. L. No. 39-31, 14 Stat. 27; and Freedmen’s Bureau Act of 
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the ground-shifting post-Civil War Amendments, limited the interpretation 
of the Nineteenth Amendment, blocked ratification of the Equal Rights 
Amendment (ERA), and dismantled the mid-twentieth century’s modest 
equality infrastructure. Constitutional equality was effectively stripped of its 
regenerative potential. Their roots in the constitutional landscape now weak-
ened, both gender and race equality have been cast into treacherous seas—
with gender hanging onto race like a castaway clinging to a slender piece of 
doctrinal driftwood. 
Each moment of mobilization and democratic participation toward real 
equality has been met by a reflexive reassertion of the rights, values, and 
entitlements of a modestly reformed status quo. Courts in particular have 
dramatically and continuously undermined efforts to rectify race and gender 
subordination in society by rolling back what legal equality guarantees could 
have achieved. As a result, prior efforts have not produced real equality in 
social life, nor can they until the racial and gendered baselines that ground 
the constitutional order are denaturalized and uprooted. 
As a central instance, judicial interpretation has continuously hobbled 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s promising guarantee of equal protection of the 
laws.10 Indeed, the Amendment’s most far-reaching implications, which 
could have dismantled the legal infrastructure that constituted and insulated 
white supremacy, were snuffed out in their infancy. Less than twenty years 
after the formal end of slavery, the Supreme Court characterized congres-
sional efforts to remedy widespread discrimination against Black people as 
special treatment.11 A century later, courts brutally truncated the Amend-
ment’s mid-twentieth century renaissance12 by interpreting inequality so nar-
rowly that its reproduction remains largely undisturbed by any meaningful 
 
1865, Pub. L. No. 38-90, 13 Stat. 507. However, courts quickly restricted these initiatives’ potential for 
greatest impact. See, e.g., Cumming v. Richmond Cty. Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528 (1899) (permitting 
racial segregation in schools); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (permitting racial segregation in 
public facilities as consistent with the meaning of constitutional equality); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 
U.S. 3 (1883) (holding Congress was not empowered to end private racial discrimination); United States 
v. Cruickshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876) (holding that provisions of the Bill of Rights do not apply to state 
governments); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876) (narrowly construing the Fifteenth Amend-
ment); The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (holding that the Privileges and Immun-
ities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment only protected rights of national, not state, citizenship). 
 10.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause has been interpreted 
to apply constitutional equality standards to the federal government, just as the Fourteenth Amendment 
does to the states. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). 
 11. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 25 (repudiating the Civil Rights Act of 1875 in part for 
treating African Americans as the “special favorite” of the law). 
 12.  Courts’ interpreting prior guarantees to end legalized segregation are examples. Swann v. Char-
lotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (upholding policies to end de facto school segrega-
tion); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (upholding Congress’s power to bar private 
racial discrimination in property sales under the Thirteenth Amendment); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 
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legal imperatives.13 
Fatally, in Washington v. Davis, the Court decreed that nonexplicit dis-
crimination with disparate effects on racial groups must be proven inten-
tional to be unconstitutional.14 In the Court’s view, an overwhelmingly dis-
parate injury inflicted on a disadvantaged racial group was not enough to 
trigger equal protection concern even in the face of utterly predictable and 
proven outcomes.15 Only actions taken with a conscious desire to actively 
harm a vulnerable group would be held illegal.16 Discriminatory intent, so 
defined, is subjective. Evidence of it is thus largely within the control of ac-
cused discriminators, making it easy to exercise, easy to deny, and almost 
impossible to prove. Consequently, prevailing constitutional doctrine effec-
tively insulates countless decisions that actively harm structurally subordi-
nated populations. 
The Court doubled down on the intent requirement in Personnel Ad-
ministrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, applying it to sex.17 It held that a 
preference for veterans in employment that predictably and knowingly ad-
vantaged men over women was constitutionally permissible absent proof that 
the scheme was deployed specifically to hurt women. Feeney spelled out 
with devastating clarity that decision-makers could comfortably rest dispar-
ity-producing preferences on the built-in inequalities created by myriad in-
stitutions—so long as they could plausibly deny a specific intent to harm 
women.18 By depriving women of the right to challenge disadvantages built 
 
U.S. 483 (1954) (holding de jure racial segregation in schools unconstitutional); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 
U.S. 629 (1950) (requiring state law school admit Black students under the Fourteenth Amendment); 
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding racially restrictive housing covenants judicially unen-
forceable under the Fourteenth Amendment); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (holding racial 
limitations on political party membership unconstitutional under the Fifteenth Amendment); Missouri ex 
rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (holding that states must provide legal education facilities for 
Blacks that were substantially equal to those for whites). But these efforts have been increasingly stymied. 
 13. See, e.g., Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 572 U.S. 291 (2014) (holding that 
states may constitutionally ban affirmative action by referendum); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. 
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (prohibiting use of race classifications in school-assignment 
plans); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (invalidating a public university’s specific use of race in 
admissions); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (prohibiting racial quotas in 
state medical school admissions); Capacchione v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Sch., 57 F. Supp. 2d 228 
(W.D.N.C. 1999) (holding a public magnet school’s consideration of race constitutionally impermissi-
ble). 
 14.  426 U.S. 229, 240–41 (1976). 
 15. Id. 
 16.  Id. at 240 (holding that the “invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must 
ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose”). 
 17.  442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979) (holding that a law’s disparate impact on women must be intentional 
in order to be deemed sex based and in violation of the Equal Protection Clause). 
 18. Id. 
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on preferences for men—even those made possible by the near-complete ex-
clusion of women by law or policy—the Court largely reduced the Equal 
Protection Clause to a minimalist intervention against some explicitly dis-
criminatory articulations termed “facial.”19 
Submerged was the deeper obstacle to meaningful gender equality. Sex 
discrimination is more often accomplished by omission of socially gendered 
experiences such as pregnancy or sexual assault than explicitly expressed in 
law. The narrowing of constitutional sex equality jurisprudence to mainly 
facial discrimination further gutted the Equal Protection Clause of its sub-
stantive potential. In much the same way that the Court resisted conceptions 
of equality that disrupted the existing distribution of white rights and entitle-
ments, Feeney—considered a non-facial case—ensured that gendered base-
lines favoring men, including legal ones, would frame practices that mapped 
onto them as benign or not gendered at all. This made the inequality these 
practices imposed difficult or impossible to expose, contest, and change by 
law. 
In the Court’s sense of vindictively motivated acts consciously targeted 
“because of” group membership, most discrimination is not intentional.20 But 
discrimination is no less damaging when built into social norms and struc-
tures. Decision-makers, driven by unconscious or implicit bias in favor of 
the superiority of whites and/or men,21 may fail to perceive or appreciate the 
heavy burden their actions force on subordinated groups. No conscious intent 
is required for such bias to animate decision-making; yet existing constitu-
tional doctrine makes its recognition as discrimination extremely difficult, 
facilitating the reproduction of inequality. 
The intent requirement, paired with the formalistic policing of classifi-
cations under heightened review, together stabilize rather than dismantle the 
raced and gendered social order. Racial classifications, under prevailing ti-
ers-of-scrutiny analysis, are subject to strict scrutiny, grounded in the obser-
vation that historically they have been vehicles of racial subordination.22 Yet 
 
 19.  There is no doctrinal test for what is facial and what is not. 
 20.  Id. at 270. 
 21.  See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Uncon-
scious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (1987) (noting that most Americans are “unaware” of their 
racism and fail to acknowledge how cultural experiences influence beliefs about race); see also Charles 
R. Lawrence III, Unconscious Racism Revisited: Reflections on the Impact and Origins of “The Id, the 
Ego, and Equal Protection,” 40 CONN. L. REV. 931, 939–40 (2008) (revisiting his 1987 article and ex-
ploring how white supremacy is maintained). In the years since Charles Lawrence’s initial publication, 
much research has supported his analysis. See, e.g., Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Im-
plicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4, 20 (1995); Chris-
tine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 969, 971–73 (2006); Justine 
E. Tinkler, Controversies in Implicit Bias Research, 6 SOC. COMPASS 987, 987–88 (2012). 
 22. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
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the history that animates the Court’s apoplectic denunciations of racial clas-
sifications has been abstracted from its material reality and gentrified with 
new occupants. Measured against a historical standard, the landmark race 
cases of the post-Warren Court era have arguably been white-rights cases23—
largely successful campaigns to arrest legislative and administrative efforts 
to remedy the contemporary consequences of the very history that justifies 
heightened scrutiny.24 The Equal Protection Clause must mean the same 
thing for everybody, the Court majestically intones. But packaged in its mis-
leading rhetoric equating colorblindness and gender neutrality—so-called 
same treatment—with constitutional equality are precisely the discordant 
protections that the Court repudiates. The Court shields the rights and enti-
tlements of those whom the Constitution has historically privileged and dis-
arms the aspirations of those it has historically excluded. 
The difficult doctrinal barriers the Court imposed on racially subordi-
nated groups are virtually absent in the jurisprudence developed in response 
to white grievances against remedial measures. Legal standing, causation, 
presumptions, and burdens of proof reveal not only a lightened burden for 
white plaintiffs; they also expose the stubborn baselines against which cor-
rective remedies are repackaged as illegitimate preferences that discriminate 
against white people. The Court’s supposed solicitude for an equality that 
means the same thing to everyone—“neutrality”—obscures its more reliable 
role in defending white supremacy. 
The gravitational pull of the foundational baselines obscures the dis-
criminatory dimensions of an Equal Protection Clause that protects and in-
sulates gendered as well as racial power, while co-opting the tools that might 
disrupt the reproduction of such inequality. The elision of gender bias is so 
deeply entrenched that it is not seen as gender-based at all. Sexual assault, 
reproductive control, and the family, for instance, are all crucial sites of the 
creation and exercise of male power, yet laws about them are overwhelm-
ingly not assessed by equality standards at all. Even where gender-based 
equality nominally exists in law, it is constrained by a fixation with classifi-
cations and their ranking into tiers of scrutiny.25 This approach effectively 
means that the more perfectly a distinction by law fits a distinction in society, 
the more “rational”—hence, less discriminatory—it is seen to be. 
The result is that the more effective a system of inequality is socially, 
the more “rational” it will be found constitutionally, rendering constitutional 
 
 23.  See Luke C. Harris, Lessons Still Unlearned: The Continuing Sounds of Silence, 10 DU BOIS 
REV. 513 (2013). 
 24.  See id. 
 25.  See, e.g., Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 438 (1985); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 
190, 211 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring). 
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law virtually useless in disrupting the conditions that most need changing to 
end gender inequality.26 Recognizing “sex” as a suspect classification would 
not solve this problem but rather would accentuate its effect, given that the 
Court looks to whether “sex” justifies a sex classification, and what it finds 
to be “sex” is frequently the reality of social sex (that is, gender) inequality. 
Requiring the sexes to be “similarly situated” before a discrimination claim 
can be brought also serves to evade the reality that social discrimination of-
ten prevents women from being situated similarly to men in the first place. 
The fundamental strategy of sex equality litigation has been to get rights for 
men in order to get them for women. Constitutional equal protection law has 
accordingly worked better for men, whose claims of sex discrimination have 
provided its foundation,27 than for women of any color. 
This basic approach—a separate and overly vigilant policing of reme-
dial racial classifications, a status-quo-oriented solicitude toward gender, 
and a failure to recognize sex inequality other than in the facial sense—rein-
forces rather than remedies cascading social harms across multiple overlap-
ping constituencies. It has not only left victims of combined discrimination 
in a quandary as to the standard that applies to them;28 it has drained the 
blood, sweat, and tears of those who sought to replace the flawed vision of 
the Founders with a constitutional order that embodies the rhetorical claims 
made in its defense. 
As a result, white and male supremacy continues and is socially resur-
gent, reinforcing brutal, sometimes lethal, disadvantages. The Founders’ 
handprints are visible across social hierarchies today despite corrective 
amendments and diligent litigation. The contemporary consequences of the 
founding formula have not been erased by gradualist improvements and 
symbolic reforms—and as things stand will not be. Material inequalities be-
tween the enslaved and those who benefitted from their enslavement, un-
 
 26. Id. 
 27.  See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (holding that a statute that required husbands but not 
wives to pay alimony violated the Equal Protection Clause); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) 
(striking down as unconstitutional a New York statute that allowed unwed mothers but not unwed fathers 
a veto over the adoption of that couple’s children); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (holding that a 
statute that denied the sale of alcohol to individuals of the same age based on their gender violated the 
Equal Protection Clause); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (striking down a provision of 
the Social Security Act that permitted widows but not widowers to collect special benefits while caring 
for children); see also David Cole, Strategies of Difference: Litigating for Women’s Rights in a Man’s 
World, 2 LAW & INEQ. 33, 33–35 (1984) (examining effects of several leading sex discrimination cases 
brought by male plaintiffs). 
 28. See Devon W. Carbado & Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, An Intersectional Critique of Tiers of Scru-
tiny: Beyond “Either/Or” Approaches to Equal Protection, 129 YALE L.J.F. 108 (2019) (deploying an 
intersectional analysis to reveal how the tiers-of-scrutiny analysis obscures the incoherence of the stand-
ard particularly with respect to Black women). 
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compensated and unremedied, live on in yawning wealth and well-being dis-
parities, conditions that the Court considers uncorrectable societal inequal-
ity. Like their enslaved ancestors, African Americans experience greater ex-
posure to racialized surveillance and state-sanctioned violence,29 suffer 
compromised access to education,30 housing31 and health care,32 and face 
continuing obstacles to their full political participation.33 
 
 29. Young Black men are more likely to be incarcerated, and are less represented in college-student 
populations, than their white peers. E.g., Criminal Justice Facts, SENT’G PROJECT, https://www.sen-
tencingproject.org/criminal-justice-facts [https://perma.cc/89DH-TT3Z] (noting that one in three Black 
young men born in the United States in 2001 will become incarcerated, as compared to one in seventeen 
white young men); The Condition of Education 2019: College Enrollment Rates, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. 
STAT. 2 (2019), https://nces.ed.gov 
/programs/coe/pdf/coe_cpb.pdf [https://perma.cc/PEP3-DFPG]. Black people are terrifyingly vulnerable 
to unpunished police brutality. See, e.g., Anthony L. Bui et al., Years of Life Lost Due to Encounters with 
Law Enforcement in the USA, 2015-2016, 72 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & COMMUNITY HEALTH 715, 716 (2018) 
(highlighting that police violence disproportionately impacts young people of color). 
Although vulnerability to violence is frequently understood as male-exclusive, Black women also face 
disproportionate risks of both lethal state violence and private violence. See Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw 
& Andrea J. Ritchie, Say Her Name: Resisting Police Brutality Against Black Women,” AFR. AM. POL’Y 
F. 4–7 (2015) http://static1.squarespace.com/static 
/53f20d90e4b0b80451158d8c/t/55a810d7e4b058f342f55873/1437077719984/AAPF_SM_Brief_full_si
ngles.compressed.pdf [https://perma.cc/HK8V-WWS5]. 
 30. African Americans attend schools that are more racially segregated now than they were when 
segregation was first prohibited. See, e.g., Valerie Strauss, Report: Public Schools More Segregated Now 
Than 40 Years Ago, WASH. POST. (Aug. 29, 2013, 3:49 PM EST), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2013/08/29/report-public-schools 
-more-segregated-now-than-40-years-ago [https://perma.cc/M7XE-K2JA]. See generally Erica Franken-
berg & Chungmei Lee, Race in American Public Schools: Rapidly Resegregating School Districts, HARV. 
U.: C.R. PROJECT (Aug. 2002), https://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-
and-diversity/race-in-american-public-schools-rapidly 
-resegregating-school-districts/frankenberg-rapidly-resegregating-2002.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/LQ56-F48M] (describing increasing school segregation since the 1980s). 
 31. See, e.g., Joseph P. Williams, Segregation’s Legacy, U.S. NEWS (Apr. 20, 2018, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.usnews.com/news/the-report/articles/2018-04-20/us-is-still-segregated 
-even-after-fair-housing-act [https://perma.cc/MQZ8-Z8WV] (noting that fifty years after the Fair Hous-
ing Act, designed to eliminate housing discrimination, was signed into to law, America remains nearly as 
segregated as when the law was passed). See generally Bruce Mitchell & Juan Franco, HOLC “Redlin-
ing” Maps: The Persistent Structure of Segregation and Economic Inequality, NAT’L COMMUNITY 
REINVESTMENT COALITION (Mar. 20, 2018), https://ncrc.org 
/holc [https://perma.cc/9ESA-CVR7] (describing growing housing segregation). 
 32. Jennifer Jones, Comment, Bakke at 40: Remedying Black Health Disparities Through Affirma-
tive Action in Medical School Admissions, 66 UCLA L. REV. 522, 532–33 (2019) (noting disparities in 
Black health outcomes, such as shortened life expectancies compared to whites, higher infant mortality 
rates, and higher death rates from cancer and AIDS). 
 33. See, e.g., Vann R. Newkirk II, Voter Suppression is Warping Democracy, ATLANTIC (July 17, 
2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/07/poll-prri-voter-suppression 
/565355 [https://perma.cc/C2T4-9HD2] (noting deep structural barriers to the ballot for minority voters). 
White women in slave-owning families and institutions not only benefitted from those systems, but were 
at times active agents within it, buying and selling enslaved people, exploiting that relation for relative 
empowerment. See STEPHANIE E. JONES-ROGERS, THEY WERE HER PROPERTY: WHITE WOMEN AS 
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The material and spiritual dimensions of lives shaped by the theft of 
land and national integrity from Native Americans and the Mexican State are 
also framed in sociopolitical discourse as natural and inevitable, rather than 
as the contemporary manifestations of a ruthlessly constitutionalized colo-
nial and imperial regime. Native peoples and their cultures continue to be 
subjected to assimilationist pressures and land, resource and child expropri-
ation—contemporary forms of genocidal practices historically inflicted by 
the U.S. government.34 Unfettered by meaningful constitutional constraints, 
Native peoples have been deprived of self-determination, jurisdiction to ad-
judicate aggression (including sexual) against them, and many treaty rights.35 
Native women are disproportionately trafficked for sex, prostituted, and dis-
appeared.36 Beyond anti-Black and settler colonialism are institutionalized 
patterns of xenophobic bias against immigrants of color, which deprive 
scores of people of basic human rights, including rights to security and fam-
ily.37 
The historical foundations upon which male supremacy rests continue 
to ground conceptions of gender equality that normalize gender hierarchy 
and frame departures from it as exceptional. Discrimination based on sex and 
gender, to the limited extent it has been constitutionally prohibited, has been 
recognized only very recently and merely by interpretation—not originally, 
 
SLAVE OWNERS IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH (2019). 
 34. See, e.g., Barbara Perry, From Ethnocide to Ethnoviolence: Layers of Native American Victim-
ization, 5 CONTEMP. JUST. REV. 231, 232–33 (2002) (exploring the various forms of institutionalized 
exploitation and marginalization of Native Americans); Lisa. M. Poupart, The Familiar Face of Geno-
cide: Internalized Oppression Among American Indians, 18 HYPATIA 86, 87 (2003) (discussing how the 
consequences of colonialism have created a government-sanctioned systematic genocide of American 
Indians). 
 35. For examples of deprivations of treaty rights, see New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 
U.S. 324 (1983) (hunting and fishing); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980) 
(logging); Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955) (timber); and Johnson v. M’Intosh, 
21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543, 588 (1823) (“Conquest gives a title which the Courts of the conqueror cannot 
deny. . . .”). Native peoples have also been deprived of legal jurisdictions in criminal law. See Alex Tall-
chief Skibine, Indians, Race, and Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country, 10 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 49, 
49 (2017) (explaining that criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country depends on whether the alleged perpe-
trator or victim qualifies as “Indian”). 
 36. See, e.g., Steven W. Perry, American Indians and Crime 1991-2002, U.S. DEP’T JUST. 6 (2004); 
Sarah Deer, Relocation Revisited: Sex Trafficking of Native Women in the United States, 36 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 621, 624–29 (2010) (explaining the relationship between colonization and sex traf-
ficking of Native women). 
 37. See Richard A. Boswell, Racism and U.S. Immigration Law: Prospects for Reform After 
“9/11?”, 7 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 315, 333–37 (2003) (explaining how an “anchor” immigration sys-
tem like that of the U.S. disfavors people from groups previously excluded from admission, and dispro-
portionately impacts immigrants of color). 
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textually, or historically—making its protection particularly thin and vulner-
able.38 Despite some legal progress for (mostly elite) women, male domi-
nance continues to characterize existing laws and their application.39 Laws 
responsive to women’s circumstances and the social order that subordinates 
them either do not exist or are unenforced.40 State laws against domestic vi-
olence and sexual assault have virtually never been held to equality standards 
in their design or effect.41 The federal legislation against violence against 
women was found to lack constitutional basis.42 Pregnancy is not constitu-
tionally recognized as sex based,43 limiting defenses of reproductive rights 
to those that live under other constitutional rubrics. All women on average 
are not paid equally to men—largely because they are segregated into work 
that is valued less because women are doing it, or that is seen as appropriate 
for women because it is valued less hence paid less.44 This dynamic is accen-
tuated for women of color.45 This pervasive social arrangement has been 
 
 38.  Discrimination based on sex and gender was first constitutionally recognized by the Supreme 
Court in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971), which held that sex-differential laws must be rationally 
related to valid legislative purpose. 
 39.  See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (holding that an elite military college’s 
policy of excluding women violates the Equal Protection Clause); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 
228 (1989) (finding that a firm denying accounting partnership to a woman employee because of sex 
stereotyping constitutes sex discrimination). But see Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) 
(recognizing statutory sexual harassment as sex discrimination, a non-elite advance). 
 40. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY 3 (3d ed. 2016) (noting the “potent com-
bination of social and political mechanisms” that enforce the institutionalized subordination of women). 
 41. See Andrea B. Carroll, Family Law and Female Empowerment, 24 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 11–
22 (2017) (detailing how state laws attempting to help domestic-violence victims actually impair some 
women’s rights). However, state statutes are held to equality standards when they are said to discriminate 
facially against men. See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981), where a state sexual 
assault statute said to facially apply only to men who had sex with underage girls was upheld. No position 
is taken here on whether men were discriminated against by the statute, although a substantive equality 
rationale for the ruling would have been an improvement. 
 42. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617, 627 (2000) (holding that Congress exceeded its 
authority under the Commerce Clause and the Equal Protection Clause in enacting the civil remedy pro-
vision of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994). 
 43.  Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496–97 (1974). 
 44.  MACKINNON, supra note 40, at 253–56. Women also provide most of the unpaid caretaking 
work for their own families. Wendy A. Bach, The Hyperregulatory State: Women, Race, Poverty, and 
Support, 25 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 317, 323 (2014). 
 45.  For instance, in 2018, the median income of Black women was only 65.3% of the median in-
come of white men, whereas white women earned 81.5% of what white men earned. Ariane Hegewisch 
& Heidi Hartmann, The Gender Wage Gap: 2018 Earnings Differences by Race and Ethnicity, INST. FOR 
WOMEN’S POL’Y RES. (Mar. 7, 2019), https://iwpr.org/wp-content 
/uploads/2019/03/C478_Gender-Wage-Gap-in-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZG6Y-8HFY]; see also Kath-
erine Richard, The Wealth Gap for Women of Color, CTR. FOR GLOBAL POL’Y SOLUTIONS (Oct. 2014) 
http://www.globalpolicysolutions.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10 
/Wealth-Gap-for-Women-of-Color.pdf [https://perma.cc/JH74-M7F6] (finding that in 2012, Black 
women and Latina women earned 64% and 54% of wages of white men, while white women earned 78% 
of wages of white men). 
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found not to violate existing equality laws.46 Women, within and across ra-
cial groups, are comparatively impoverished and economically insecure. 
They are violated with impunity, exploited economically and sexually, and 
deprived of social stature and human dignity. The intersectional effects of 
race and gender are facilitated within the U.S. sociolegal system, cumula-
tively stacking the deck against women of color, depriving them of the most 
basic means to articulate meaningful claims within existing constitutional 
doctrine. 
The vitiation of equality on the bases of race and gender extends to re-
lated forms of hierarchy. Discrimination based on sexual orientation en-
forces compulsory heterosexuality, a means of maintaining male supremacy. 
Even in the face of the striking legal progress for lesbian women and gay 
men in recent years, their rights are restricted to areas in which state or fed-
eral statutes have been invalidated by the courts—for example, by prohibit-
ing laws criminalizing sodomy47 and by requiring recognition of same-sex 
marriage48—or under statutes guaranteeing sex equality.49 However, in some 
jurisdictions, same-sex partners can still be married on Sunday and fired on 
Monday for the same reason.50 Discrimination against transgender people, 
another kind of gender-based discrimination, is frequently brutal and lethal, 
 
 46. See, e.g., County of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 179–80 (1981) (allowing a comparable 
worth claim so long as women prison guards’ pay rates are proven intentionally discriminatory); Am. 
Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps. (AFSCME) v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401, 1406–07 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(holding that Title VII permits Washington to set wages according to historically sex discriminatory mar-
ket practices). 
 47.  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
 48.  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015). 
 49.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2018). See, e.g., Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 112–13 
(2d Cir. 2018) (holding that sexual orientation discrimination is a subset of sex discrimination prohibited 
under Title VII), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019); Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 
345 (7th Cir. 2017) (same). 
 50. Whether the Title VII prohibition on sex discrimination applies to sexual orientation or 
transgender status is pending before the Supreme Court, to be decided during the 2019 Term. See Altitude 
Express, Inc. v. Zarda, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (cert. granted); Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 139 S. Ct. 1599 
(2019) (same); Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v. EEOC, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (same). This issue has par-
ticular impact on the intersection of sexual orientation, gender identity, and race. A recent study analyzing 
over 9,000 sexual-orientation and gender identity discrimination charges found an “overrepresentation of 
Black charging parties,” which, combined with allegations of race discrimination, “suggests that the in-
tersection of these stigmatized identities could shape experiences of employment discrimination for this 
group.” M.V. Lee Badgett et al., Evidence from the Frontlines on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity 
Discrimination, UNIV. OF MASS. AMHERST: CTR. FOR EMP’T EQUITY (July 2018), 
https://www.umass.edu/employmentequity/evidence-frontlines-sexual-orientation-and 
-gender-identity-discrimination [https://perma.cc/8VVF-DQAM]. 
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causing unemployment,51 homelessness,52 and vicious stigmatization without 
meaningful systemic relief.53 
Inequality is not inevitable. Indeed, it takes considerable force to main-
tain, given the fact that all peoples are human equals—meaning, at minimum, 
that no racial and/or gendered group is actually superior or inferior to an-
other. Human hierarchy based on sex and/or race is not only a political con-
struction created to confer power on some over others. It is predicated on the 
lie of natural hierarchy: the fiction that the actual basis, origin, and founda-
tion of the present socially tiered status of sex- and race-based groups is sex 
and/or race itself, rather than the power interests of those who dominate on 
those grounds—grounds that are themselves constructed by these same po-
litically interested configurations. Failure to order societies to correspond to 
the reality of equality has resulted in the intensification of inequality over 
time, making it appear to be “just there” to many, reinforcing the ideology 
of its natural basis. The law’s participation in obscuring the fact that the ex-
isting system is one of imposed social hierarchy rather than natural differ-
ence—or, in any event, that such “differences” as exist are equal—has ra-
tionalized and legitimated inequality. 
As a result, despite the focused and determined efforts of committed 
movements, communities, organizations, lawyers, and some scholars, led by 
generations of valiant activists, the United States remains a deeply unequal 
society. Its laws, against formidable interventions for change, have largely 
operated to maintain that inequality. This must end. 
  
 
 51. Sandy E. James et al., The Report of the 2015 U.S. Transgender Survey, NAT’L CTR. FOR 
TRANSGENDER EQUALITY 140–41 (Dec. 2016), https://transequality.org/sites/default/files 
/docs/usts/USTS-Full-Report-Dec17.pdf [https://perma.cc/5RTJ-TKLX]. 
 52.  Id. at 110. 
 53.  Some circuits have recognized transgender discrimination as sex discrimination under Title VII. 
See, e.g., Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th 
Cir. 2004); Rosa v. Park West Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213 (1st Cir. 2000); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 
F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000). The best decision conceptually is the breakthrough case of Schroer v. Billing-
ton, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D.D.C. 2008). Other courts refuse to cover gender identity discrimination under 
Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination. See, e.g., Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., No. 00-3114, 2002 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17417 (E.D. La. Sept. 16, 2002). Trans individuals continue to face “extraordinary” 
levels of physical and sexual violence, with more than one in four trans people reporting that they have 
faced a “bias-driven assault” and even higher rates for trans women and trans people of color. Issues:  
Anti-Violence, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, https://transequality.org/isues/anti 
-violence [https://perma.cc/BH5H-ZRMW]. 
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II.  NEW EQUALITY AMENDMENT DRAFT 
The Equality Amendment 
Whereas all women, and men of color, were historically excluded as 
equals, intentionally and functionally, from the Constitution of the 
United States, subordinating these groups structurally and systemi-
cally; and 
Whereas prior constitutional amendments have allowed extreme ine-
qualities of race and/or sex and/or like grounds of subordination to 
continue without effective legal remedy, and have even been used to 
entrench such inequalities; and 
Whereas this country aspires to be a democracy of, by, and for all of 
its people, and to treat all people of the world in accordance with hu-
man rights principles; 
Therefore be it enacted that— 
Section 1. Women in all their diversity shall have equal rights in the 
United States and every place subject to its jurisdiction. 
This language provides affirmative equality rights to all women, rather 
than prohibiting states from denying women equal rights, whether intention-
ally or inadvertently, facially or by impact. Because women are not exclu-
sively, or even principally, made or kept unequal to men by the actions of 
states, but rather by the social order—its structures, forces, institutions, and 
individuals acting in concert—this Section has no state-action requirement. 
The state does not so much act to deny equality of rights through law as it 
fails to guarantee freedom from these violations, and fails to provide legal 
claims against them or precludes those claims altogether. Equality is power-
fully denied to women through law abdicating an equality role, for example, 
in domestic violence, sexual abuse and exploitation, and unequal pay for 
work of comparable worth. Law allows these violations to happen, and to 
continue to happen, until they form the substrate of the normal. The negative 
state—the state as embodied in a constitution that supposedly guarantees 
rights best by intervening in society least—has largely abandoned women to 
social inequality imposed on them by men. This Section therefore affirma-
tively envisions equality as a right, permitting legal claims for discrimination 
against nonstate actors and state actors alike who deny equal rights to 
women. 
Marginal improvements can be made in women’s conditions by ad-
dressing sex as an abstraction, as in Section 2 of this Amendment. But ab-
stract equality enshrines dominant groups as the standard, failing to rectify 
discrimination for those who do not meet it. Inequality, meanwhile, itself 
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denies access to the means of meeting dominant standards and creates the 
illusion that those standards are neutral or meritocratic, when they are simply 
dominant. Substantive equality, in contrast, begins with recognizing the con-
crete historical situation of subjected, violated, and denigrated people, called 
by name: women in all their diversity.54 This concrete language is particu-
larly useful for avoiding failures to address the situation of women who are 
multiply subjected, who under the abstract equality approach are open to the 
dodge that their discrimination is based on factors other than sex.55 Here, 
they are women. Women encompass characteristics of virtually every social 
group: women’s diverse qualities and inequalities substantially make up 
what a woman is. When used through or with sex or gender to discriminate 
against them, that is discrimination because they are women, therefore what 
discrimination against women as such looks like. 
Section 2. Equality of rights shall not be denied or abridged by the 
United States or by any State on account of sex (including pregnancy, 
gender, sexual orientation, or gender identity), and/or race (including 
ethnicity, national origin, or color), and/or like grounds of subordina-
tion (such as disability or faith). No law or its interpretation shall give 
force to common law disadvantages that exist on the ground(s) enu-
merated in this Amendment. 
Section 2 provides for negative rights that are predicated on discrimi-
natory state action, state or federal. Once rights are provided unequally, a 
legal claim of discrimination can arise. This Section adapts in its first sen-
tence the basic language of the ERA proposed in 1972, passage of which 
would itself be an improvement.56 Notably, the first clause of Section 2 is 
 
 54. The first time the idea of substantive equality was spoken in public was 1989. See CATHARINE 
A. MACKINNON, BUTTERFLY POLITICS 110 (2017). See generally MACKINNON, supra note 40 (develop-
ing the concept of substantive equality across U.S., comparative, and international law and theory); Cath-
arine A. MacKinnon, Substantive Equality Revisited: A Rejoinder to Sandra Fredman, 15 INT’L J. CONST. 
L. 1174 (2017) (arguing that hierarchy of power is the fundamental dynamic of inequality); Catharine A. 
MacKinnon, Substantive Equality: A Perspective, 96 Minn. L. Rev. 1 (2011) (arguing that reality of sub-
stantive inequality should be incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee). 
 55. See generally KIMBERLÉ CRENSHAW, ON INTERSECTIONALITY (forthcoming 2020); Kimberlé 
Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrim-
ination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 139–40, 166–67; 
Kimberlé Crenshaw, The Urgency of Intersectionality, TEDWOMEN (Oct. 2016), 
https://www.ted.com/talks/kimberle_crenshaw_the_urgency_of_intersectionality 
[https://perma.cc/J4V5-E994]; Kimberlé Crenshaw, Why Intersectionality Can’t Wait, WASH. POST 
(Sept. 24, 2015, 3:00 PM EST), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory 
/wp/2015/09/24/why-intersectionality-cant-wait [https://perma.cc/X3LL-GWCH]. 
 56. For the conventional articulation of the interpretation of the 1972 ERA, which may yet be rati-
fied, see generally Barbara A. Brown et al., The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for 
Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871 (1971). 
 RECONSTITUTING THE FUTURE 125 
identical to the Nineteenth Amendment and the 1972 ERA, but for its sub-
stitution of “equality of rights” in place of the right to vote.57 Some of the 
equality theory animating the Equality Amendment—for instance, its sub-
stantive and concrete rather than formal and abstract approach, and its un-
derstanding of intersectionality as a necessary component of sex—could be 
used in interpreting the 1972 ERA, should it be ratified and come into force. 
The language of the Equality Amendment locks in its distinctive approach, 
meaning, and application. Providing such explicit instruction to courts makes 
it less likely that the standard symmetrical approach to equality will be re-
flexively applied and the asymmetries—that is, the actual social inequalities 
that need to be remedied—will remain ignored. The express reference to sub-
ordination in the Equality Amendment provides more substantive language 
that otherwise could be reduced to anti-classification (as if classification is 
the only injury of subordination, when it is merely one tool of it), or to anti-
stereotyping (as if being typecast as a member of a group of which one is a 
member is the essence of inequality, when it is merely one tool of it, and 
only sometimes). Hierarchy is inequality’s real injury. And, of course, the 
Equality Amendment applies beyond sex itself. 
Pregnancy, gender, sexual orientation, and gender identity are grouped 
under “sex” because they are all facets of the unified but diverse system of 
inequality that privileges maleness and masculinity over femaleness and 
femininity, enforcing sexual rules and gendered myths, roles and stereo-
types, and punishing noncompliance. Discrimination against transgender or 
nonbinary persons based on gender or sex, including nonconformity, would 
be covered. Similarly, ethnicity, national origin, and color are grouped under 
“race” because they are complexly but inexorably racialized in the United 
States, privileging whiteness and punishing as lesser anyone seen as not so-
called white. 
Adaptability is part of the ingenuity, the genius, of inequality. Section 
2’s “like grounds” clause is thus open-ended, while maintaining race and sex 
as the substantive touchstones for the covered inequalities. The “like 
grounds” clause permits recognition of as yet unknown or unanticipated 
forms inequality can take. 
This Amendment is designed to cover lacunae in existing law. Disabil-
ity is expressly covered because of inadequacies in existing legislation and a 
general failure to recognize that it is social assumptions, not individuals’ par-
ticular abilities, that result in the deprivation of resources and dignity and 
extreme marginalization of disability discrimination. Like every inequality, 
discriminatory deprivations are distinctive to this ground: distinctively 
 
 57. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. 
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wrenching, extreme, irrational, and cumulatively and systemically disad-
vantaging. 
Although many constitutional and statutory provisions exist to protect 
spiritual beliefs and practices, including those fundamental to the Founding, 
failures to protect minority religions make clear the need to include this pro-
vision expressly.58 All groups are entitled to constitutional rights, but domi-
nant religions have less purchase here, as they would need to show subordi-
nation, a substantive term relative to evidence, similar to that suffered by 
women and people of color, who lack adequate coverage by existing law. 
One possible like ground, adequately litigated, could be social and eco-
nomic class. But race and sex discrimination together and separately do a 
great deal of class work. Just how much of class disadvantage would be left 
if race and sex inequality were adequately addressed is an open question. In 
addition, class as a factor, for women especially, is often vicarious and pro-
tean, its features calling for full concrete development. 
Of course, the Equality Amendment’s language does not imply or per-
mit an intent requirement. This is because discrimination is not a moral fail-
ing of individuals but a pervasive social practice of power—epistemic, prac-
tical, and structural. No one need intend to perpetuate discrimination for it to 
persist. Therefore, no showing of intent is required to legally undo and rem-
edy it. 
The last sentence of Section 2 prohibits interpretive piggybacking on 
existing long-term discrimination that is built into the common law. Consider 
that Section 1 would prohibit as a denial of equality much social discrimina-
tion that is not now prohibited and is embodied in common law. A cardinal 
example of denying force to common law disadvantages predicated on ine-
quality is Shelley v. Kraemer, in which state court decisions upholding ra-
cially restrictive covenants were denied enforcement under the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s equal protection guarantee.59 This ruling has been largely con-
fined to its facts; its larger animating principle is captured in Section 3. 
Section 3. To fully realize the rights guaranteed under this Amend-
ment, Congress and the several States shall take legislative and other 
measures to prevent or redress any disadvantage suffered by individ-
uals or groups because of past and/or present inequality as prohibited 
by this Amendment, and shall take all steps requisite and effective to 
abolish prior laws, policies, or constitutional provisions that impede 
 
 58. See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (upholding the Trump Administration’s 
“Muslim Ban”); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (quashing a Muslim detainee’s claims of discrim-
ination and mistreatment). While text matters in interpretation, conflicts between provisions cannot be 
entirely precluded by drafting. 
 59. 334 U.S. 1, 23 (1948). 
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equal political representation. 
The word “shall” affirmatively requires legislative and administrative 
authorities to implement this Amendment. There is no option not to, although 
the text of the Section leaves its precise implementation open. 
The distribution of political power built into the Constitution impedes 
democratic progress, making it far easier to sustain conditions made uncon-
stitutional by this Amendment than to dismantle them. The undemocratic 
protection, promotion, and insulation of an unequal socioeconomic order—
slavery—continues to structure the political system under which leadership 
is elected, undermining the capacity for change in accordance with this 
Amendment. It must be dislodged from the Constitution’s foundation. Sec-
tion 3 leaves to Congress the task of evaluating the Electoral College, for 
example, but giving more weight to voters in some states than in others in 
presidential elections would likely invalidate it. Upon ratification of this 
Amendment, Congress would be required to take up the question under this 
Amendment’s approach. 
Section 4. Nothing in Section 2 shall invalidate a law, program, or ac-
tivity that is protected or required under Section 1 or 3. 
Undoing discrimination is not discrimination. Promoting equality un-
does inequality. Section 4 repudiates the premise that classification per se is 
the injury of inequality and embraces the understanding that group hierarchy 
is the essence of inequality’s injury.60 Accordingly, this Section requires that 
any law, policy, or practice qualifying as protected or required under Sec-
tions 1 and 3 may not be eliminated under Section 2. Currently, for example, 
affirmative-action plans and policies can be constitutionally challenged as 
discriminatory based on the notion that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits 
treatment based on categories or classifications rather than imposed relations 
of superiority and inferiority among groups or precluded opportunities of 
certain groups.61 So long as the requirements of Sections 1 and/or 3 are met, 
and it is recognized that the Equality Amendment supersedes the Equal Pro-
tection Clause (and Fifth Amendment Due Process as to the federal govern-
ment) in the equality arena, as it should, this reverse engineering of inequal-
ity into equality guarantees would be over. 
 
 60. This proposed section parallels Section 15(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 
which states that the equal-rights protection found in Section 15(1) “does not preclude any law, program 
or activity that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups.” 
Can. Const. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. 1 (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), § 15(2). 
 61. John Valery White, What is Affirmative Action?, 78 TUL. L. REV. 2117, 2124 (2004). 
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III.  RECONSTITUTING THE FUTURE 
The proposed Equality Amendment embraces an intersectional ap-
proach to equality, prioritizing race and gender for historical as well as con-
temporary reasons. This year’s Nineteenth Amendment Centennial, com-
memorating women’s right to vote, must not obscure the reality that not all 
women became full citizens upon the Amendment’s passage. As the suffrage 
struggle for the Nineteenth Amendment demonstrates, the political processes 
used to change laws deeply influence the substantive changes that those laws 
can produce. The fight for the vote for all women was intertwined with at-
tempts to repeal the Fifteenth Amendment, which prohibits states from deny-
ing the right to vote based on race, color, or prior servitude,62 because of 
white racist fears of enfranchising Black women.63 The suffrage movement 
often excluded African American women from its marches and speaking 
platforms, despite their determined support for the right to vote.64 Historical 
disempowerment of women of color by some women’s suffrage organizers 
and entities contributed to a demobilization that has undermined their full 
participation in the political process, and thus real democracy, today. The 
Equality Amendment is therefore predicated on recognizing the full inter-
connection between race- and gender-based subordination and is designed to 
deinstitutionalize it in all of its forms. But in recognition of the relationship 
between the politics of lawmaking and the law that politics makes, it will be 
the political mobilization, if pursued by the politics that animate this text, 
that produces its passage, as much as anything in its wording, that guarantees 
that the dual erasure of women of color is not replicated. 
The Equality Amendment has been needed all along. But it is needed 
now as much or more than ever. Without equality, democracy is in peril: real 
equality provides the voting power to break the glass ceiling, guaranteed 
rights that raise the floor for all citizens, and recognition of the reality that 
inequalities intersect and overlap, making it impossible to rectify one alone. 
All Americans deserve equality guarantees that cannot be taken away or dis-
regarded. And in a true democracy, each citizen should have an equal right 
to vote and have their vote count equally. Only the Constitution can provide 
this power and protection. But no constitutional amendment alone can guar-
antee these results. History shows that law is subject to retrenchment as well 
 
 62. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. 
 63.  See Kimberly A. Hamlin, How Racism Almost Killed Women’s Right to Vote, WASH. POST (June 
4, 2019, 6:00 AM EST), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/06/04/how 
-racism-almost-killed-womens-right-vote [https://perma.cc/H7PP-P8A8]. 
 64. See, e.g., ANGELA Y. DAVIS, Racism in the Woman Suffrage Movement, in WOMEN, RACE, AND 
CLASS 70, 70–86 (1981). 
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as advance, particularly when emerging from and overlaid upon a noninter-
sectional power grid. This is not a reason to succumb, but a challenge to 
create the conditions for change. 
Most Americans believe that the Constitution already guarantees equal 
rights.65 Unlike most constitutions in the world, it does not.66 It is the respon-
sibility of “We, the People” to adapt the Constitution to the society we live 
in; to grow in our recognition of problems and potential solutions; to 
strengthen our democracy in an intimately interconnected world. Neither too 
vague nor too prescriptive, this proposal, offered as a beginning, aspires to 
sketch a path, to clear terrain to open a space for everyone to fill and, finally, 
to be heard. 
Generations past have fought and died for equality, bringing us to this 
moment. The perceptions, principles, and language of this proposal can be 
used as a guide to legal and political action in every realm. Having broken 
the code by which U.S. equality law and theory has been constrained from 
fulfilling its promise, we are determined to be the last generation to fight for 
it. We can all be framers. 
 
 65. A 2016 poll commissioned by the Equal Rights Amendment Coalition suggests that eighty per-
cent of Americans believe that the Constitution guarantees equal rights to men and women. Nicole Tor-
toriello, Making the Case for the Equal Rights Amendment, ACLU VA.  
(Jan. 3, 2019, 1:00 PM), https://acluva.org/en/news/making-case-equal-rights-amendment 
[https://perma.cc/K8JG-Y2YA]. 
 66.  See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Gender in Constitutions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 397, 404 (Michel Rosenfeld & András Sajó eds., 2012). 
